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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the base of mortgage law is the Equity of Redemption.1  This is a 
common law right, which developed in England centuries ago,2 and is part of the 
law the colonists brought over to America.  The equity of redemption allows a 
mortgagor a period of time after he defaults within which to pay off the loan and 
not lose the property3 or—perhaps more importantly—any equity the mortgagor 
                                                            
* Juris Doctorate Candidate, 2015, Pepperdine University School of Law.  Rabbinical Ordination 
received 2010, Yeshiva Centre of Sydney. 
1 See GRANT S. NELSON, DALE A. WHITMAN, ANN M. BURKHART & R. WILSON FREYERMUTH, 
REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT CASES AND MATERIALS 112–15 (8th ed. 
2009) (discussing the evolution of the modern mortgage arrangement and the introduction of 
equitable principles into the real estate transaction). 
2 Id. 
3 Id.  Foreclosure is the actual time of cutting off the equity of redemption.  Id.  Before the 
concept of a foreclosure sale was introduced, the common law mortgages included a date for 
repayment called “law day.”  Id.  If the mortgagor could not pay off the debt on that day he would 
forfeit all his interests in the property to the mortgagee, even if the only reason for the mortgagor’s 
inability to pay was his inability to find the mortgagor on that day.  Id.  The English Chancery courts 
established the concept of a right of the mortgagor to a tardy redemption of the property, which 
became the source of the equity of redemption.  Id.  Foreclosure was then instituted to allow the 
mortgagee to go into court and establish a date on which the mortgagee’s right of redemption would 
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owns in the property.4  During this period of time between default and the 
foreclosure sale, which eventually developed from a “strict foreclosure,” the 
lender is losing equity in the property.5  The relatively small per-transaction 
amount of equity the lender loses in cases of default on residential property can 
be justified by the competing policy goal of allowing homeowners an extra 
chance to keep their property.  However, in bigger commercial mortgages—
where the property is not a homestead—those policy concerns are not as great, 
and there is less justification for a long delay between default and the 
foreclosure sale.  Moreover, the potential monetary losses to the mortgagee in 
the period between default and foreclosure sale are much larger in commercial 
mortgages than they are in residential loans for smaller amounts of money.6 
Ancillary remedies were developed by the law to protect lenders during 
the period between default and foreclosure sale and, consequently, encouraged 
lenders to make such loans.7  The ancillary remedies available to a lender after 
                                                            
be cut off.  Id.  Later evolution of foreclosure led to the advent of the foreclosure sale.  Id. 
4 “Equity” is defined as “the value of a piece of property (such as a house) after any debts that 
remain to be paid for it (such as the amount of a mortgage) have been subtracted.”  Equity 
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/equity 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2014).  This means, if a mortgagor defaults on a $100,000 loan secured by a 
mortgage on a $200,000 property, the mortgagor owns $100,000 of equity in his property.  See 
generally NELSON ET AL., supra note 1.  Under the old English rules of law day or even under strict 
foreclosure, any equity the mortgagor owned in the property would be forfeited to the mortgagee.  
Id.  The modern foreclosure sale and right to surplus from the sale was instituted to protect the 
mortgagor’s right to his equity in the property.  Id. 
5 This occurs due to the fact there is typically a long period of time from the mortgagor’s default 
on his loan until foreclosure proceedings begin, run their course, and finally conclude with a 
foreclosure sale.  See Amy Loftsgordon, States With Long Foreclosure timelines, NOLO, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/states-with-long-foreclosure-timelines.html (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2014)  (saying foreclosures in the first quarter of 2013 took an average of 477 days to 
process and mentioning judicial foreclosures—the type of foreclosure this article is primarily 
concerned with, because only with a judicial foreclosure are deficiency judgments permitted—take 
even longer than that timeframe).  During this time, the mortgagor in default typically does not make 
payments on the loan, and, in effect, is living on the property rent-free until the foreclosure sale, or 
until the end of the statutory redemption period in the states that allow the debtor to retain possession 
during that period.  See generally NELSON ET AL., supra note 1.  The mortgagor is, therefore, taking 
equity out of the property equal to the fair rental value of the property during the time he is in 
possession without paying.  Id. 
6 This is simply because the cost of maintaining the property and paying property taxes will be 
higher—even if not proportionally higher—than in a residential property.  Additionally, commercial 
properties generate profits, because even though the owner is in default, he may still have tenants 
and favorable leases on the property, and mortgagors in default may be tempted to keep those profits 
rather than pay them towards the debt. 
7 NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 358.  The text explains there are three theories of mortgage: 
title theory, lien theory, and the intermediate theory.  Id.  These three theories explain the nature of 
the mortgagee’s interest in the property.  Id.  Under the title theory, the mortgagee obtains legal title 
at the signing of the mortgage; under lien theory legal title may not be passed until foreclosure 
occurs.  Id.  The interest of the mortgagee in the property can affect what manner of ancillary 
remedies is available to him in the interim between default and foreclosure sale.  Id.  Under title 
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the mortgagor defaults are: (1) possession;8 (2) assignment of rents agreements;9 
and (3) appointment of a receiver.10  One of the advantages to appointing a 
receiver, rather than taking possession of the land or executing an assignment of 
the rents agreement, is the receiver acts as an intermediary that insulates the 
mortgagee from certain liabilities involved with having possession of the land.11  
Another advantage is mortgagees are typically institutional lenders who are not 
in the business of managing land,12 and the appointed receiver will generally be 
someone more familiar with, and better equipped to perform, the task.13  
The mortgages where a receiver will be used are generally recourse 
mortgages, meaning a deficiency judgment or personal liability is available to 
cover any part of the debt not satisfied by the foreclosure sale.14  However, to 
assess personal liability, the foreclosure must be conducted judicially, which 
takes even longer than non-judicial foreclosures.15  The receiver’s role is to 
                                                            
theory the mortgagor may be entitled to take possession of the property, though generally not 
without some judicial action, while in a lien theory jurisdiction the mortgagee will have to resort to 
enforcing an assignment of the rents agreement.  Id. 
8 Id. at 360. 
9 Id. at 372. 
10 Id. at 392. 
11 See Coleman v. Hoffman, 64 P.3d 65, 67–70 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing the trial court 
ruling for summary judgment on the common law premises liability claim as to Hoffman and 
Anderson Hunter and saying, due to the fact they took possession of the property, they were exposed 
to premises liability claims stemming from that property); cf. Trustco Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Eakin, 
681 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).  Receiver is a court officer and not an agent of the 
parties, and during the pendency of the receivership the property is in the possession of the court 
itself.  Id.  In this case, poor management and lack of funds with which to manage the property lead 
to it depreciating in value during the time of the receivership, but the receiver was immunized from 
liability as an officer of the court, and the mortgagee had not taken possession of the property 
because the receiver is not his agent and was, therefore, not liable for the depreciation of the land’s 
value.  Id.   
12 See Joaquin Benitez, Foreclosure: The secret the banks don’t want you to know!, TRIBUNA 
(July 25, 2013), http://www.tribunact.com/foreclosure/. 
13 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 567–68 (West 2012) (stating “The receiver must be sworn 
to perform the duties faithfully,” and those powers include “power to bring and defend actions in his 
own name, as receiver; to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, to 
compound for and compromise the same, to make transfers, and generally to do such acts respecting 
the property as the [c]ourt may authorize.”).  
14 See, e.g., CIV. PROC. § 580b(a)(3) (West 2014) (“[N]o deficiency shall be owed or collected, 
and no deficiency judgment shall lie, for . . . a deed of trust or mortgage on a dwelling for not more 
than four families given to a lender to secure repayment of a loan that was used to pay all or part of 
the purchase price of that dwelling.”).  This statute is representative of the general legislative intent 
of specifically providing anti-deficiency protection to residential—consumer—loans, and such laws 
are not in place to protect commercial borrowers. 
15 See Loftsgordon, supra note 5 (saying this is because a court is “involved in every step of the 
foreclosure.  As a result, the judicial foreclosure process often takes a lot longer than a non-judicial 
one.  Backlogged courts, judges’ schedules, hearings, and required paperwork all contribute to a 
prolonged process.  Courts are simply unable to process a large volume of foreclosures in an 
expedited manner.”).  
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make sure the profits being generated in the interim between the default and the 
foreclosure sale go towards paying down the debt and not towards padding the 
mortgagor’s pockets.16  When the mortgage is non-recourse and there can be no 
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor, a receiver is vital to ensure the 
mortgagee can recover as much of the money owed to him as possible.17  
The receiver aids that goal by ensuring the profits accruing from the 
default until the sale go towards the debt, and the losses suffered by the lender 
will be minimalized.  The focus of this article is on the abilities of the receiver 
and the restrictions put on him regarding his management of the property—
specifically, whether the receiver has the ability to sell the land free and clear of 
all liens, and, if so, under what circumstances and by what method.  
Part II gives an overview of the article, discusses the structures of 
receivership statutes in various jurisdictions, and further discusses receivership 
sales.18  Part III analyzes the statutory frameworks and caselaw from a selection 
of jurisdictions with regards to their treatment of receiverships and focuses on 
sales made by the receiver in the foreclosure context.19  Part IV suggests any 
uniform law for sales by receiverships should consist of three elements: (1) the 
agreement must be made post-default; (2) there should be an objection system to 
protect junior lienholders; and (3) there should be exceptions to protect 
homesteads and farm owners.20 
II. OVERVIEW AND GOAL OF THE ARTICLE 
Every state has its own statutory framework regarding receiverships.21  
                                                            
16 See CIV. PROC. §§ 567–68.  Duties of the receiver are tasks pertaining to the goal of directing 
profits from the property to the mortgagee that the court appointed the receiver for.  Id. 
17 While this will not often come up in mortgages for residential properties where there are no 
profits being generated that the mortgagee stands to lose, this can occur in other circumstances.  A 
prime example of an instance where a receiver is vital and the loan is non-recourse is the case of a 
commercial property, which is transferred subject to the mortgage i.e., the grantee did not assume 
personal liability for the property.  In such cases, the grantor/mortgagor is secondarily liable on the 
debt and can be found personally liable but will generally not be in a position to pay that debt.  
NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 453.  If the creditor tries to levy against him, the grantor/mortgagor 
will declare bankruptcy.  In this case, it is imperative for the mortgagee to stop the grantee from 
draining equity from the property and not being personally liable for any deficiencies at the 
foreclosure sale.  The quick use of a receiver—sometimes ex parte—can put a stop to the grantee’s 
equity draining.  The practice of taking subject to a mortgage in default, or almost in default, and 
diverting profits away from the mortgagee has been criminalized in some jurisdictions as “rent 
skimming”.  See CIV. PROC. §§ 890–94.  
18 See infra Part II and accompanying notes 21–39. 
19 See infra Part III and accompanying notes 40–202. 
20 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes 203–209. 
21 See, e.g., CIV. PROC. § 564 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 14.32 (2014); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 576.21 (West 2014); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW (McKinney 2014); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 7.60.005 (West 2014). 
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These vary as to when and how the receiver is appointed,22 as well as what the 
receiver can do to the property,23 and when and to what extent he must report to 
the court.24  The focus of this article is on examining various states’ approaches 
to receiverships, particularly receivers appointed in the mortgage foreclosure 
context.  The article will proceed by examining a state’s statutory framework 
and will then explore any relevant caselaw.   
Receivers selling land free and clear of liens in public or private sales, 
depending on the reasonable estimate of the form most likely to bring in the best 
value for the land, are a parallel to trustees in a bankruptcy court.25  Trustees 
charged with selling the land can do so in any format, subject to approval by a 
court, calculated to bring in the most value.26  They are incentivized to execute 
the estate to bring in maximum value by tying their compensation to the total 
amount of funds they generate for the pool to pay off unsecured creditors.27  A 
similar device could be used in the foreclosure receiver context by giving him 
multiple options and allowing the receiver to determine which route is likely to 
bring the most value to all parties: maintaining the property and collecting rents, 
selling the land publicly at an auction, or conducting a private sale, subject to 
court approval.  The receiver could then be compensated commensurate with 
how much value the receivership estate benefited from the property.28 
                                                            
22 See, e.g., CIV. PROC. § 564 (West 2014); GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 14.32 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 
576.24 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.025 (2014). 
23 See, e.g., CIV. PROC. § 568 (West 2014); GEN LAWS ch. 156B § 106 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 
576.25(5)(d) (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.060 (2014). 
24 See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1182 (Jan. 1, 2007), available at  
http://www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=three&linkid=rule3_1182; MASS. R. CIV. P. 66 
(West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 576.36 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.100 (2014). 
25 See Federal and State Court Receiverships as Alternatives to Bankruptcy – Pros and Cons, 
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, http://www.abiworld.org/BestofABI/materials/StateLaw 
ReceivershipMemo.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014) (“The general receiver is analogous 
to a bankruptcy trustee [because] the receiver controls all the assets and operates the businesses with 
the intent to either sell such assets as a going concern or liquidate the assets of the business.  In 
either case, the receiver disburses the proceeds to the creditors according to the priority of their 
interests.”). 
26 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other 
than in the ordinary course of business. . . . The trustee may sell property . . . free and clear of any 
interest in such property of an entity other than the estate.”). 
27 Id. § 326(a) (“In a case under chapter 7 or 11, the court may allow reasonable compensation 
. . . of the trustee for the trustee’s services . . . not to exceed 25 percent on the first $5,000 or less, 10 
percent on any amount in excess of $5,000 but not in excess of $50,000, 5 percent on any amount in 
excess of $50,000 but not in excess of $1,000,000, and reasonable compensation not to exceed 3 
percent of such moneys in excess of $1,000,000, upon all moneys disbursed or turned over in the 
case by the trustee to parties in interest, excluding the debtor, but including holders of secured 
claims.”). 
28 This could be measured by percentage of rents or in the case of a sale perhaps calculated as 
percentage of amount gained above the reasonable expected sale price at foreclosure, including the 
losses from waiting that long, and court and other procedural fees. 
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A receiver that is empowered to sell land free and clear of liens can pursue 
potential buyers with all the tools used in conventional land sales.29  In 
conventional real estate sales, the seller can shop the property to find the best 
price.  If an acceptable offer is not made, the seller has the luxury of not making 
the sale.  The current state of foreclosure sales, as well as receiver sales in some 
states, requires an auction.30  The bidding is intended to bring about a good price 
through competition, but, in reality, this is not necessarily true.31  This is due to 
the fact there must be a sale at the end of the auction day, regardless of whether 
any good offers were made.32  A receiver sale in which the receiver may act as a 
real estate agent would bring about a higher sales price.33  This is a benefit to 
                                                            
29  Patrick Mears & Dustin Daniels, Sales of Receivership Assets Free and Clear of Liens and 
Interests, 38 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 112 (2011).  When a receiver is restricted to sales by public 
auction, the sale price is capped at the amount the highest bidder present at the auction will bid.  This 
can lead to property being sold at a discount because the seller has given up the valuable negotiating 
ability of being able to walk away.  A more common approach to selling real estate is the use of 
agents and brokers who actively seek out the best buyer for the particular property, rather than 
posting notice for an auction and hoping the right buyer bids at the right price.  When the receiver is 
able to sell in this manner, he is better able to get more value for the property.  Another difference 
between the conventional sale for land and sales by a receiver is, while most homes for sale are sold 
free and clear of liens and include a deed with an implied warranty of good title, oftentimes the 
property held by the receiver is subject to multiple liens, including junior mortgage holders and 
judgment lienholders.  Even when the purchase price of the property is discounted to account for 
junior liens on the property, the very existence of those interests harms the value of the property 
because buyers are hesitant to purchase land subject to imminent foreclosure and due to the “first in 
time first in priority” principle, buyers of land subject to liens will have a more difficult time finding 
new financing.  Allowing receivers to sell property free and clear of liens can give the receiver a 
more marketable asset with more willing buyers, and, thus, lead to a higher purchase price.  Those 
liens would be converted into unsecured claims on the mortgagor with a priority interest on the 
proceeds of the sale of the property.  The higher price from the sale of the property, due to its 
increased marketability and clean title, ultimately benefits the junior interests because it is likely 
there will be more money when the sale is conducted by conventional means.  And, if the 
foreclosure would have run its course and ended in a regular foreclosure sale, the junior interests 
would not have been better off, because their claims would be wiped out after the foreclosure sale, to 
satisfy the senior interests.  
30 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at Chapter 6. 
31 See, e.g., Baskurt v. Beal, 101 P.3d 1041, 1042–43 (Alaska 2004).  In this case, the property 
value was at least above $100,000, and perhaps worth double that amount.  Id. at 1042.  But, due to 
the manner of the sale—a foreclosure auction sale—the price was limited to the most anyone present 
would be willing to pay.  Id.  In this case, Baskurt made the opening and only bid for $26,781.81, a 
dollar over the remaining debt owed on the property, on behalf of the partnership.  Id. at 1043.  
There were no other bids, and the property was sold to Baskurt, Joyce, and Rosenthal via a trustee’s 
deed.  Id.  The sale in this case was voidable but not because of the low purchase price.  Id.  at 1044–
46. 
32 See by Andrew Latham, Foreclosure Auction Rules, SFGATE,  
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/foreclosure-auction-rules-1383.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). 
33 See Yuen Leng Chow, Isa Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, Auction versus Negotiated Sale: 
Evidence from Real Estate Sales, ANDREW.CMU.EDU (Feb. 8, 2011), http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=2437&context=tepper (discussing situations in which auctions can bring in 
higher sales prices than traditional real estate broker sales).  But, it is important the receiver have the 
ability to use whichever method of sale is reasonably calculated to realize the most value from the 
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both the mortgagee and mortgagor.  It would also be a faster and more efficient 
process than the standard public sale in a foreclosure, because the receiver is 
appointed soon after default and could begin selling the property, if that is 
determined to be the best course of action, immediately, rather than waiting the 
months or years until the foreclosure sale.  
The arguments against a receiver selling free and clear of liens is the 
mortgagor will lose his right to statutory redemption, in the states in which there 
is such a right,34 and, more importantly, sales by a receiver can be seen as a way 
of circumventing the foreclosure process and being a clog on the equity of 
redemption.  A clog on the equity of redemption can be anything that takes away 
the mortgagor’s rights to late payment, after default, before the mortgagee 
completes all foreclosure proceedings, which now includes a foreclosure sale.35  
Clogs on the equity of redemption are not allowed in any jurisdiction in the 
United States or the United Kingdom, among many others.36  But, the issue of 
sales by receivers being a clog on the equity of redemption only arises when the 
agreement to allow such sales is made ex ante37—that is, the agreement is in the 
original mortgage note or was agreed to before the mortgagor defaulted.38  
Similar agreements made ex post—“work-out” agreements after a default—can 
shortcut the foreclosure process, if the mortgagor defaults again or fails to meet 
                                                            
property.  Id.  When the receiver is free to determine whether this property is of a heterogeneous 
nature and will be well served by a public auction, or if the property is not highly in demand or 
unique and will be best served by carefully seeking out the right buyer, then the receiver has the 
proper tools to maximize the property’s value.  Id. 
34 See generally Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the 
Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 589 (2010) (“In almost 
half of the states the foreclosure sale is not the end of the road for the borrower.  A concept 
commonly termed ‘statutory redemption’ allows the mortgagor-debtor and, in many instances, junior 
lienholders, up to a year or longer to regain title after the foreclosure sale by paying the foreclosure 
purchaser the sale price plus accrued interest and other expenses.”).  
35 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at chapter 3. 
36 See id. at 115–16 (discussing several forms of mortgage substitutes that developed over time 
as ways to circumvent the clogging the equity of redemption doctrine).  If the clog on the equity is 
obvious and poorly concealed by the particular device, the court may allow parole evidence to show 
the device is in fact a mortgage and should be treated as such.  The installment land contract is a rare 
case of a mortgage substitute that is not fully under mortgage law.  Id; see also id. at 272 (discussing 
the same concepts of clogs on the equity of redemption in more depth). 
37 Id. at 272.  “For centuries it has been the rule that a mortgagor’s equity of redemption cannot 
be clogged and that he cannot, as a part of the original mortgage transaction, cut off or surrender his 
right to redeem.  Any agreement which does so is void and unenforceable as against public policy.”  
Id; see also id. at 272–73 (quoting 4 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 
1193, at 568 et seq. (5th ed. 1941)) (“[I]f the instrument is in its essence a mortgage . . . the debtor or 
mortgagor cannot, in the inception if the instrument . . . in any manner deprive himself of his 
equitable right to come after default . . . to redeem the land from the lien and encumbrance of the 
mortgage; the equitable right of redemption, after a default is preserved, remains in full force, and 
will be protected and enforced by a court of equity, no matter what stipulations the parties may have 
made in the original transaction purporting to cut off this right.”).  
38 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 272. 
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some other provision of the work-out agreement, without being a clog on the 
equity of redemption.39 
 
III. SURVEY OF RECEIVERSHIP STATUTORY AND CASELAW FRAMEWORKS 
 
As the law developed, many areas of law were codified by legislature, 
either on a state-by-state basis or at the federal level.  Real property law, 
however, has been ruled, to a large extent, by the common law doctrines and 
legal traditions that were developed over centuries.  Real property has been 
treated separately from personal property to a point where the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), one of the few examples of property law that has 
been uniformly adopted by the states, excludes real property security interests 
from its article nine code of secured transactions.40  The UCC goes so far in its 
exclusion of real property from article nine that even rents, which are arguably 
like any other accounts receivable, are excluded from the UCC if they derive 
from the use of land.41  Due to this general hesitance to enact sweeping 
legislation on real property, there are few national laws pertaining to real 
property.42  And, even on a more local level, a lot of discretion is left to the 
courts.43  
The statutory framework for some states is silent on the subject of 
                                                            
39 See id. at 277.  (“The ‘anti-clogging’ doctrine is generally inapplicable to transactions that are 
subsequent to the execution of the mortgage.”).    
40 UCC § 9-109. 
41 See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism in the Bankruptcy 
Courts: Implications for Reforming Commercial Real Estate Finance, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1512 
(1993) (examining the UCC approach to rents as being real property as well as the land versus 
services distinction that determines whether the particular rents are controlled by article nine). 
42 For example, the masterfully crafted Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act has not been 
adopted by a single state.  Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Nonjudicial%20Foreclosure%20Act (last visited Dec. 
18, 2014).  Another example is the Uniform Assignment of rents clause, which is viewed as a very 
successful real property uniform law despite it being adopted in (what would be considered in other 
contexts) a paltry five states, not including Massachusetts who introduced it in 2014, since its 
introduction in 2005. Assignment of Rents Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws. 
org/Act.aspx?title=Assignment%20of%20Rents%20Act (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).  
43 See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.031(5) (West 2014) (“Perform other acts 
in regard to the property as authorized by the court.”).  See generally 2 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: PROPERTY § 111 (4th ed. 2001) (“The distinction between real 
and personal property is still drawn in the United States in the light of the historical past, and real 
property continues to be defined as a freehold interest in land.  But, because tenures have been 
largely abolished by statutes declaring all land to be allodial, and in jurisdictions in which tenures 
may be said to have survived the only remaining incident of tenure is escheat, the distinction 
between real and personal property has lost most of its original significance.  In contemporary 
American practice, therefore, distinction is made between land and movables, and modern treatises 
of property law include consideration of both elements of wealth.”). 
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receiverships in the mortgage and foreclosure context.44  Many others use a 
general “skeleton” set of guidelines for receivers and leave the details to 
common law and the court system.45  This approach emphasizes the receiver is 
an agent of the court and, thus, can do “such other duties respecting the property 
as authorized by the court,”46 or “generally to do such acts respecting the 
property as the court may authorize.”47  With this overly generalized charge, the 
legislature allows caselaw to determine the exact contours of the receiver’s 
powers.  
There are, however, some states whose statutes address this topic in more 
depth,48 and there are federal statutes that apply to specific types of land.49 
A. Federal Statutory Framework 
Federal laws about receiverships and receivers’ abilities are discussed in 
the context of prejudgment remedies under Chapter 176, Federal Debt 
                                                            
44 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.40.240 (2014) (“A receiver may be appointed by the court in any 
action or proceeding . . . when the party’s right to the property that is the subject of the action or 
proceeding and that is in the possession of an adverse party is probable, and where it is shown that 
the property or its rents or profits are in danger of being lost or materially injured or impaired.”).  In 
the case of Alaska’s statutory framework, the application of receiverships to foreclosure proceedings 
is not clearly spelled out. 
45 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 568 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 8-605 (2014); IND. 
CODE § 32-30-5-7 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1302 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425.600 
(West 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-302 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-10-04 (2014); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2735.04 (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1554 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
21-21-9 (2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-33-104 (West 2014). 
46 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 66(c) (2014). 
47 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425.600; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-10-04; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-33-
104. 
48 See MINN. STAT. § 576.24 (2014) (establishing there are two kinds of receiverships and “[a] 
receivership may be either a limited receivership or a general receivership.  Any receivership that is 
based upon the enforcement of an assignment of rents or leases, or the foreclosure of a mortgage 
lien, judgment lien, mechanic’s lien, or other lien pursuant to which the respondent or any holder of 
a lien would have a statutory right of redemption, shall be a limited receivership . . . a receiver may 
have control over all the property of the respondent.  At any time, the court may order a general 
receivership to be converted to a limited receivership and a limited receivership to be converted to a 
general receivership.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.015 (2014) (establishing two types of receivership: 
“A receiver must be either a general receiver or a custodial receiver.  A receiver must be a general 
receiver if the receiver is appointed to take possession and control of all or substantially all of a 
person’s property with authority to liquidate that property . . . . A receiver must be a custodial 
receiver if the receiver is appointed to take charge of limited or specific property of a person or is not 
given authority to liquidate property. . . .  When the sole basis for the appointment is the pendency of 
an action to foreclose upon a lien against real property . . . the court shall appoint the receiver as a 
custodial receiver.  The court by order may convert either a general receivership or a custodial 
receivership into the other.”); Id. § 7.60.260 (allowing a receiver to make sales free and clear of 
liens). 
49 28 U.S.C. §§ 3103, 2001 (2012). 
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Collection Procedure.50  In Section 3103, the statute grants the receiver the 
ability to “sell pursuant to section 3007 such real and personal property as the 
court shall direct.”51  Section 3007 says the motion to sell the property may be 
initiated by the court itself or by either party.52  The statute lays out two 
guidelines as to the authority to sell perishable personal property.53  First, the 
property must be “likely to perish, waste, or be destroyed, or otherwise 
substantially decrease in value during the pendency of the proceeding.”54  
Secondly, if the above condition is met, the “court shall order a commercially 
reasonable sale of the property.”55  
The statute does not define the term “commercially reasonable.”  This 
grants the court the ability to determine whether the property is properly sold at 
a public auction or, if sold in a private sale, the price agreed to is commercially 
reasonable.  
However, in 28 U.S.C. § 2001 the statute lays out a more detailed 
framework for judicial sales of land.56  The statute says property in the 
possession of a receiver “shall be sold at public sale in the district wherein any 
such receiver was first appointed.”57  The statute also allows a private sale to be 
confirmed by the court, “if [the court] finds that the best interests of the estate 
will be conserved thereby.”58  The statute further states, before a court may 
confirm a private sale, there must be three independent appraisals of the 
property to be sold,59 and the court will not confirm any sale for less than two 
thirds of the appraised value.60  Additionally, the agreed price for the land to be 
sold privately must be advertised for ten days,61 and “[t]he private sale shall not 
be confirmed if a bona fide offer is made, under conditions prescribed by the 
court, which guarantees at least a [ten] per centum increase over the price 
offered in the private sale.”62 
It should be noted the federal statutes are not specifically dealing with a 
receiver’s sale made during a foreclosure proceeding,63 and it could be argued 
any sales during a foreclosure proceeding cut off a bit of the mortgagor’s equity 
                                                            
50 Id. § 3103. 
51 Id. § 3103(b)(1)(B). 
52 Id. § 3007(a). 
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. § 2001.  This section is under Chapter 127, Executions and Judicial Sales. 
57 Id. § 2001(a). 





63 These statutes are under the chapter dealing with judicial proceedings generally and 
executions and judicial sales generally.  Id. §§ 1961–1964; see also id. §§ 2001–2007. 
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of redemption.  Nevertheless, these statutes give a clear picture of how the 
United States Code deals with the sales of property during pending judicial 
actions generally,64 and the additional laws that are in force when dealing with 
real property.65  
B. California 
Under the California statutes, a receiver can be appointed in the mortgage 
foreclosure context, “where it appears that the property is in danger of being 
lost, removed, or materially injured, or that the condition of the deed of trust or 
mortgage has not been performed, and that the property is probably insufficient 
to discharge the deed of trust or mortgage debt.”66  When describing the 
receiver’s powers, the California statute details the basic duties of a receiver, 
including possession, receiving rents, and collecting debts.67  The statute goes on 
to include the catchall provision granting the receiver the additional power 
“generally to do such acts respecting the property as the [c]ourt may 
authorize.”68  
In addition to this statute though, California has statutes detailing the sale 
of the property of a judgment creditor.69  The statutes detail the notice 
requirements,70 including”: 
[A notice to] all persons having liens on the real property on the date 
of levy that are of record in the office of the county recorder and 
shall instruct the levying officer to mail notice of sale to each such 
person at the address used by the county recorder for the return of 
the instrument creating the person’s lien after recording.  The 
levying officer shall mail notice to each such person, at the address 
given in the instructions, not less than [twenty] days before the date 
of sale.71 
The statutes require sales to satisfy a judgment debtor be made in the form 
of a public auction and sold to the highest bidder.72  The California statute 
specifically mentions such a sale extinguishes all subordinate liens on the 
                                                            
64 See supra note 49. 
65 28 U.S.C. § 3007 (2012). 
66 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 564(b)(2) (West 2014). 
67 Id. § 568.  
68 Id. 
69 Id. § 568.5 (“A receiver may, pursuant to an order of the court, sell real or personal property 
in the receiver’s possession upon the notice and in the manner prescribed by Article 6 [commencing 
with Section 701.510] of Chapter 3 of Division 2 of Title 9.  The sale is not final until confirmed by 
the court.”) (parentheses in original). 
70 Id. § 701.540. 
71 Id. § 701.540(h). 
72 Id. § 701.560. 
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property.73 
In People v. Riverside University,74 LeMoyne S. Badger was appointed as 
a receiver during an action brought against Riverside University to enjoin it 
from engaging in certain unlawful and fraudulent business practices75: 
The receiver was authorized and instructed to take possession of and 
preserve and maintain the property, assets[,] and records of the 
university; to continue the university in operation by employing such 
persons as may be necessary to conduct regular courses of 
instruction and to pay for their services at ordinary and usual rates 
from funds that shall come into his possession as receiver; ‘to do all 
those things and to incur the risks and obligations ordinarily incurred 
by owners, managers, and operators of similar educational 
institutions, as such receiver, and no such risk or obligations so 
incurred shall be the personal risk or obligation of the receiver, but a 
risk and obligation of the receivership estate’; to ‘exert every means 
possible to ensure that all students currently enrolled in Riverside 
University have the opportunity to complete the current quarter 
ending about June 30, 1971.’76 
The receiver alleged it was necessary to sell certain furniture and 
equipment to continue to operate the school.77  He listed everything sold and the 
prices received for them, along with an investigation showing they were sold at 
fair market value.78  In determining the validity of the receiver’s sales, the court 
quoted section 568.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedures saying, “A 
receiver may . . . sell real or personal property . . . . The sale shall not be final 
until confirmed by the court.  Sales made pursuant to this section shall not be 
subject to redemption.”79  The court went on to say, even if selling property 
would not have fallen under the breadth of his original charge, “an action of a 
receiver in equity, though taken without prior court authorization, may be 
                                                            
73 Id. § 701.630 (“If property is sold pursuant to this article, the lien under which it is sold, any 
liens subordinate thereto, and any state tax lien [as defined in Section 7162 of the Government Code] 
on the property sold are extinguished.”) (parentheses in original).  
74 People v. Riverside Univ., 111 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), superseded by statute, CIV. 
PROC. §§ 568.5, 704.740, 708.610, 708.620, as recognized in Wells Fargo Fin. Leasing, Inc. v. D & 
M Cabinets, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).  The statute establishes certain limits on 
courts’ ability to authorize a receiver to sell “the interest of a natural person in a dwelling . . . under 
this division to enforce a money judgment except pursuant to a court order for sale obtained under 
this article and the dwelling exemption shall be determined under this article.”  Id.  However, the 
statute does not reverse the court’s authorization for sale of property not subject to the statutory 
homestead procedure.  Id. 
75 Riverside Univ., 111 Cal. Rptr. at 70. 
76 Id. at 71. 
77 Id. at 72. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 73.  
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ratified by subsequent court approval.”80 
The court’s decision in People v. Riverside shows, when a receiver is 
tasked with continuing the operation of a business or property, there can be a 
broad scope of powers allowed to the receiver.81  The court went so far as to say 
“the receiver was entitled to an approval of his account and final discharge, 
notwithstanding the fact the sales were not made in the manner provided for 
sales on execution.”82 
However, this case was not specifically dealing with a receiver taking 
possession during a foreclosure proceeding.  It is possible courts feel “if no good 
reason appears for refusing to confirm a receiver’s sale, such as chilling of bids 
or other misconduct or gross inadequacy of price, the sale should be 
confirmed,”83 but mortgages and foreclosures bring up the issues of equities of 
redemption and clogs on it, as well as further statutory redemptions after the 
foreclosure sale is completed. 
In Wells Fargo Financial Leasing Inc. v. D & M Cabinets,84 the judgment 
creditor foreclosed his judgment lien on the debtor’s owner-occupied dwelling.85  
There is a statutory homestead exception when foreclosing a judgment lien on 
an owner-occupied dwelling, and the creditor attempted to avoid that statutory 
procedure by appointing a receiver and charging him to sell the land to satisfy 
the debt.86  While the trial court allowed this, on appeal the court found, “Wells 
Fargo moved for appointment of a receiver for the express and limited purpose 
of selling the subject property without complying with section 704.740.  
Accordingly, [it reversed] the order in its entirety.”87  We may draw a parallel 
from Wells Fargo Financial to the topic of equity of redemption.  It would 
follow from Wells Fargo Financial, if a court found the sole purpose of 
appointing a receiver was to sell the property and circumvent the mortgagor’s 
rights of equity of redemption and statutory redemption, then the court would 
reverse that order.  However, if the receiver was appointed for legitimate 
reasons, such as maintaining a property that was losing equity or that was 
potentially insufficient as security for the loan, and then circumstances after 
default mandated a sale by the receiver, the Wells Fargo Financial court may 
find the receiver’s actions were proper.88 
                                                            
80 Id. at 74. 
81 Id. at 73. 
82 Id. at 75. 
83 Id. 
84 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
85 Wells Fargo Fin., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 100–01. 
86 Id. at 102–03. 
87 Id. at 103. 
88 The court in Wells Fargo Financial found the receiver sale was solely a device being used to 
circumvent the statute. Id.  The court stressed the receiver was appointed “for the sole and limited 
purpose of selling the subject property in avoidance of section 704.740.”  Id.  The sole and limited 
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C. Minnesota 
Under Minnesota statutory framework a receiver is defined as “a person 
appointed by the court as the court’s agent, and subject to the court’s direction, 
to take possession of, manage, and, if authorized by this chapter or order of the 
court, dispose of receivership property.”89  Minnesota law distinguishes two 
types of receiverships: “general receivership and [] limited receivership.”90  The 
statute spells out “the enforcement of an assignment of rents or leases, or the 
foreclosure of a mortgage lien, judgment lien, mechanic’s lien, or other lien 
pursuant to which the respondent or any holder of a lien would have a statutory 
right of redemption,”91 as examples of when the court will order a limited 
receivership.92  If the court order appointing the receiver is silent on which type 
of receivership is being established, the default is a limited receivership.93  The 
statutes are not clear as to what circumstances would lead to the appointment of 
a general receiver, but they do say, “[a]t any time, the court may order a general 
receivership to be converted to a limited receivership and a limited receivership 
to be converted to a general receivership.”94  
The limited receivership is charged with the standard receiver’s powers 
including collecting rents and profits, and managing and maintaining the 
property.95  The general receiver is granted additional powers, most notably for 
the purposes of this article: abilities “to operate any business constituting 
receivership property in the ordinary course of the business, including the use, 
sale, or lease of property of the business or otherwise constituting receivership 
property, and the incurring and payment of expenses of the business or other 
receivership property,”96 and “if authorized by an order of the court following 
notice and a hearing, to use, improve, sell, or lease receivership property other 
than in the ordinary course of business.”97  The court may order the general 
                                                            
purpose of avoiding a statute analysis can be applied in cases where the law a receiver is avoiding is 
the common law rule of equity of redemption of mortgages the statutory redemption available in 
California as well as some other states.  The question left unanswered by the court in Wells Fargo 
Financial is whether sales by receivers that are appointed for a different cause—for example, the 
maintenance of the asset or property during the pendency of foreclosure proceedings—could be sold 
in avoidance of such laws?  And, to take the question one step further, would this court allow a 
receiver’s sale when the receiver was appointed for dual purposes—to avoid a certain law as well as 
for a legitimate reason? 
89 MINN. STAT. § 576.21(p) (2014) (internal quotations marks omitted). 





95 Id. § 576.29, subd. 1(a)(1). 
96 Id. § 576.29, subd. 1(b)(4) 
97 Id. § 576.29, subd. 1(b)(5) 
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receiver’s sale of the receivership property be free and clear of all liens,98 and, 
additionally, the court may order the sale be free of the respondent’s rights of 
redemption.99 
The Minnesota statutory framework explicitly grants large powers of sale 
to the court–appointed receivers.100  Under these statutes, a court can convert the 
default limited receivership in a mortgage proceeding into a general receivership 
and then allow that receiver to sell the receivership property free and clear of 
liens.101  
In a case heard by the Supreme Court of Minnesota as early as 1920, the 
court upheld a sale by a receiver.102  The court said, “A sale made by a receiver 
is a ‘judicial sale.’  In the absence of a statute regulating such sales, the time, 
manner, terms of sale, and notice thereof are matters to be determined solely by 
the court having jurisdiction over the proceedings and control of the 
property.”103  The appellant challenged the sale claiming the receiver did not 
observe the notice directions given by the court.104  However, the court ruled it 
was a judicial sale and, “in the absence of a statute regulating it, not only were 
the time, manner, terms of sale, and notice thereof matters to be determined 
solely by the court, but it also had discretionary power to modify the directions 
contained in the order appointing the receiver.”105 
Under Minnesota law and its interpretation, receiverships are capable of 
selling the property in the receivership.106  The statutory framework lays out a 
procedure for courts to convert receivers in the mortgage foreclosure setting into 
general receivers107 empowered to conduct court ordered sales of the 
                                                            
98 Id. § 576.46, subd. 1(a).  This includes all liens with the exception of unpaid real estate tax 
liens and liens arising under federal law.  Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. §§ 576.29, subd. 1(b)(4)–(5); MINN. STAT. § 576.30, subd. 3 (2014) (“[E]xecution of the 
deed by the receiver shall be prima facie evidence of the authority of the receiver to sell and convey 
the real property described in the deed.  The court may also require a motion for an order for sale of 
the real property or a motion for an order confirming sale of the real property.”); Id. § 576.46, subd. 
1(a) (“The court may order that a general receiver’s sale of receivership property is free and clear of 
all liens . . . and may be free of the rights of redemption of the respondent if the rights of redemption 
are receivership property and the rights of redemption of the holders of any liens, regardless of 
whether the sale will generate proceeds sufficient to fully satisfy all liens on the property.”). 
101 Id. § 576.24. 
102 Northland Pine Co. v. Northern Insulating Co., 177 N.W. 635 (Minn. 1920), abrogated by 
Hunter v. Anchor Bank, 842 N.W.2d 10, *16 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (ruling mortgage defendants’ 
failure to strictly comply with “foreclosure by advertisement” statute rendered foreclosure sale void).  
103 Northland Pine, 177 N.W. at 635. 
104 Id. at 636. 
105 Id.  It should be noted this case has been abrogated with regards to ability to ignore notice 
requirements.  Inadequate notice may result in a voided sale. 
106 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 576.29, subd. 1(b)(5) (2012). 
107 See MINN. STAT. § 576.24 (2014).  The section states a receiver in a mortgage lien foreclosure 
context is a limited receiver but then gives the court permission to “[a]t any time . . . order a general 
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receivership property.108  The statutes address the concerns that are unique to 
sales of real estate in the mortgage foreclosure context: rights of redemption and 
associated clogs on the equity of redemption,109 and the statutory right of 
redemption.110  Minnesota Statutes section 576.46, subdivision 1(a)111 addresses 
sales free and clear of rights of redemption by requiring those rights to be part of 
the receivership property being sold.112  It also allows any owner or lienholder to 
object to the sale.113  If a timely objection is filed, the court will determine 
whether “the amount likely to be realized from the sale by the objecting person 
is less than the objecting person would realize within a reasonable time in the 
absence of this sale.”114  This safeguard prevents sales that might be a clog on 
the equity of redemption by only allowing sales that are consented to by all 
parties post-default.115  
The same section provides some extra protection for the farmers and 
consumer debtors statutory redemption laws typically seek to protect allowing 
them the extra time to possess the land after the foreclosure sale.116  Perhaps to 
ensure receivership sales are used in the commercial real estate context, and not 
as a method of circumventing statutory redemption periods, Minnesota Statutes 
section 576.46, subdivision 1(a)(1) restricts the ability to sell free and clear of 
liens when either “the property is (i) real property classified as agricultural land 
under section 273.13, subdivision 23, or the property is a homestead under 
                                                            
receivership to be converted to a limited receivership and a limited receivership to be converted to a 
general receivership.”  Id.  This power allows a court to—on a case-by-case basis—convert ex-post 
facto appointed receivers in mortgage foreclosures from the default limited receivership into a 
general receivership, id., and thereby grant them the powers to sell the property, id. § 576.29, subd. 
1(b)(5), and even to sell it free and clear of liens.  Id. § 576.46, subd. 1(a). 
108 It is unclear from the language of the statute whether the sale must be a public one or if it 
may be conducted in the manner of selling property generally, by way of seeking out individual 
buyers and/or using brokers.  However, the absence of clear intent in the statute would lead towards 
the conclusion a court may authorize any type of sale subject to MINN. STAT. § 576.46, subd. 1(b) 
(2012), which gives the receiver the burden to prove the amount likely to be realized by the 
objecting person from the sale is equal to or more than the objecting person would realize within a 
reasonable time in the absence of the sale.  Id. § 576.46, subd. 1(b). 






115 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  Agreements to sell the property and circumvent 
foreclosure proceedings are not clogs on the equity of redemption when agreed to after default.  Id.  
Under this statutory framework, not only is there a owner complaint system to ensure this agreement 
to sell happened after default, there is the additional layer of defense: the requirement to go into 
court to have the receiver converted from limited to general.  MINN. STAT. § 576.24 (2014).  With 
these two safeguards in place the court can police receivership sales and ensure they are mutually 
agreeable forms of maximizing value from the property and not clogs on the equity of redemption. 
116 MINN. STAT. § 576.46, subd. 1(a)(1) (2014). 
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section 510.01; and (ii) each of the owners of the property has not consented to 
the sale following the time of appointment.”117 
D. North Carolina 
In North Carolina, a duly appointed receiver is given the power to sell 
property as one of his enumerated powers.118  The statutory framework lays out 
cases in which a receiver will be appointed.119  Mortgage foreclosures are not 
explicitly mentioned,120 but, in all likelihood, they are covered by the General 
Statutes of North Carolina section 1-502(1),121 which says a receiver may be 
appointed:  
Before judgment, on the application of either party, when he 
establishes an apparent right to property[,] which is the subject of 
the action and in the possession of an adverse party, and the property 
or its rents and profits are in danger of being lost, or materially 
injured or impaired; except in cases where judgment upon failure to 
                                                            
117 Id. 
118 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-505 (1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-507.2(4) (1955). 
119  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-502 (1981). 
120  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-507.2(2) mentions a receiver’s ability to “[f]oreclose mortgages, deeds 
of trust, and other liens executed to the corporation.”  Id.  Section 1-507.4 discusses foreclosure by 
receivers and trustees of corporate mortgagees or grantees saying:  
 
Where real estate has been conveyed by mortgage deed, or deed of trust to any 
corporation in this [s]tate authorized to accept such conveyance for the purpose of 
securing the notes or bonds of the grantor, and such corporation thereafter shall be 
placed in the hands of a receiver or trustee in properly instituted court proceedings, 
then such receiver or trustee under and pursuant to the orders and the decrees of the 
said court or other court of competent jurisdiction may sell such real property 
pursuant to the orders and the decrees of the said court or may foreclose and sell such 
real property as provided in such mortgage deed, or deed of trust, pursuant to the 
orders and decrees of such court. 
 All such sales shall be made as directed by the court in the cause in which said 
receiver is appointed or the said trustee elected, and for the satisfaction and settlement 
of such notes and bonds secured by such mortgage deed or deed of trust or in such 
other actions for the sales of the said real property as the said receiver or trustee may 
institute and all pursuant to the orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction 
therein.   
 
Id.  However, these sections discuss the situation where a corporation has become insolvent 
and the receiver is appointed to liquidate the corporation. Id. § 1-507.1.  This is a different 
circumstance than the case of a receiver simply maintaining the property during the pendency 
of foreclosure proceedings.  Moreover, the receiver in section 1-507.4 cannot sell the 
mortgaged property; he must go through the full foreclosure proceedings under this section.  
Id. § 1-507.4. 
121  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-502 
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answer may be had on application to the court.122 
Therefore, when the property being foreclosed is losing equity, as often 
can happen to a commercial property after default,123 the mortgagee can apply to 
a court to appoint a receiver.124  Once the receiver has been appointed, the 
district judge has the power to order the sale of the receivership property under 
the terms that will best serve the affected creditors.125  Section 1-505 of the 
General Statutes says to look to Article 29A of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes 
for a more detailed discussion of the procedures used in judicial sales.126  
Section 1-339.3A of that article says the “judge or clerk of court having 
jurisdiction has authority in his discretion to determine whether a sale of either 
real or personal property shall be a public or private sale.”127  The North 
Carolina statutes are not clear as to whether the sale of the property can be made 
free and clear of all liens or rights of redemption. 
E. Ohio  
The Ohio receivership statute is representative of many other states’ 
receivership statutes.128  There is a statute listing cases in which a receiver may 
be appointed,129 including in an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage by a 
mortgagee where the property seems in danger of being “lost, removed, or 
materially injured, or that the condition of the mortgage has not been performed, 
and the property is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt.”130  
However, with regards to the powers of a receiver, the statute simply states, “a 
receiver may bring and defend actions in his own name as receiver, take and 
keep possession of property, receive rents, collect, compound for, and 
compromise demands, make transfers, and generally do such acts respecting the 
property as the court authorizes.”131  The last clause of this statute is found in 
many other states’ receivership statutes, albeit with somewhat different 
                                                            
122 Id. 
123 After default, the commercial mortgagor may cease paying the mortgagee while diverting 
rents and profits to his own pocket, effectively draining equity from the property, at least until an 
assignment of rents clause is enforced.  The mortgagor also has little incentive to maintain or repair 
his property after foreclosure proceedings begin, and there is the danger the property will lose 
significant value by the time of the sale. 
124 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-502. 
125  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-505 (1971).  
126 Id. 
127  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-339.3A (1997). 
128 See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.  
129 OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 2735.01 (West 2013). 
130 Id. § 2735.01(B). 
131 Id. § 2735.04. 
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language.132  This clause, by its broad and general nature, seems to indicate a 
legislative intent charging the courts with the final decision of what powers to 
grant the receiver. 
The Ohio court of appeals ruled in Director of Transportation v. Eastlake 
Land Development Co.133 the trial court’s authorization of a receiver’s sale of a 
parcel of land free and clear of liens was an error as a matter of law.134  
However, that case did not turn on the power of receivers to sell land free and 
clear of liens or the court’s ability to authorize such sales.135  The court of 
appeals in Eastlake Land Development found the court had not properly notified 
the affected lienholder;136 thus, the sale would have been a deprivation of his 
due process rights.137  In Eastlake Land Development, the properties in question 
were two vacant industrial parcels in Eastlake, Ohio.138  John Chiappetta 
borrowed a total of $750,000 and secured the loans with three mortgages on his 
two parcels of land.139  These mortgages were all later assigned to American 
First Federal, Inc. (AFF).140  After taking out those loans against his property:  
Eastlake Land Development Company, by and through its president, 
John Chiappetta141 entered into a loan agreement and promissory 
note with the [s]tate to fund development and construction on the 
                                                            
132 See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
133 Dir. Of Transp. v. Eastlake Land Dev. Co., 894 N.E.2d 1255 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).  
134 Id. at 1261. 
135 In this case, the property was being sold free and clear of senior liens.  Id. at 1258–59.  The 
general proposition to sell property free and clear of liens is the lienholder who has the ability to 
wipe out junior liens at a proper foreclosure sale is attempting to wipe out those sell the property free 
and clear of those junior liens that are inevitably going to be extinguished through a foreclosure sale.  
There is an incentive for such a junior interest to allow the property to be sold free and clear of his 
liens in the hopes such a sale will bring a higher value to the property and perhaps pay off more of 
the debt owed to him than he would realize otherwise.  See, e.g., supra note 109 and accompanying 
text (stating the Minnesota free and clear sales statutes allows complaints to the sale if it can be 
determined the amount likely to be realized from the sale by the objecting person is less than the 
objecting person would realize within a reasonable time in the absence of this sale.  Therefore, if a 
junior lienholder wants to stop the free and clear sale by the senior lienholder he must demonstrate 
he will gain more from a foreclosure sale.  Because a foreclosure sale extinguishes the junior 
lienholder’s rights, it will generally not be possible for a junior lienholder to lodge an allowable 
complaint against the free and clear sale.  By contrast, the senior lienholder will always be as well 
off or better off if the junior lienholder does not conduct the free and clear sale and will almost 
always be able to stop the sale free and clear of his lien.).  In this case, however, the junior lienholder 
was attempting to sell property free of a senior lien without giving due process to that senior interest, 
and the court could easily find this receivership sale was invalid, even if the court was generally 
agreeable to receivership sales free and clear of junior liens. Eastlake Land Dev., 894 N.E.2d at 
1261. 
136 Eastlake Land Dev., 894 N.E.2d at 1261. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 1257. 
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 1258. 
141 Id. at 1257–58. 
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property.142  The city of Eastlake guaranteed the loan, which 
[totaled] $2,425,000.143 
. . . Eastlake Land Development Company defaulted on the loan[, 
and] the  State filed suit against Eastlake Land Development 
Company and the city of Eastlake . . . .144  
. . . The [s]tate also requested . . . a receiver . . . .    [T]he trial court 
appointed [one].145  
. . . . 
. . . [T]he receiver filed a request . . . to sell the second parcel. . . . . 
146  
. . . On January 30, 2007, the trial court entered an order setting the 
receiver’s motion for hearing on February 13, 2007.147  Inexplicably, 
however, on the same day, despite having set the receiver’s motion 
for hearing, and without vacating its order setting the hearing, the 
trial court entered an order granting the receiver’s request to sell the 
second parcel . . . . 148 
The court of appeals noted “[t]he record reflects that the receiver never 
served AFF with a summons and complaint notifying AFF that he sought to 
extinguish its interests through the sale of the property.”149  The court of appeals 
did not focus on whether the trial court had the ability to authorize the receiver 
to sell the second parcel free and clear of liens.150  Rather, the court stressed the 
question was if the trial court had the power to authorize a receiver to “sell the 
second parcel free and clear of AFF’s liens even though AFF had not consented 
to the same and had not received notice that the property would be sold free of 
its lien.”151  Once the threshold question was framed in this manner, it was easy 
for the court of appeals to find “[t]he trial court’s order authorizing the receiver 
to [sell the property free and clear of AFF’s lien] effectively resulted in a denial 
of AFF’s due-process rights and, accordingly, was erroneous as a matter of 
law.”152 
                                                            
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 1258. 
145 Id.  
146 Id. (after the first parcel had been sold over AFF’s objections). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1260. 
150 Id. at 1261. 
151 Id. (emphasis added).  
152 Id. 
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This case states this receiver’s sale of land free and clear of liens was 
invalid, but it can be inferred, if the lienholder consented to the sale, perhaps it 
would be in the power of the court to order such a receiver’s sale.153  This case 
was unusual because the sale was being orchestrated by a junior lienholder 
attempting to wipe out a senior lien that would have had priority in a proper 
foreclosure proceeding.  Therefore, the appellate court found the sale as an 
attempt to circumvent due process rights.154  However, in a more standard 
receiver setting, where the receiver is appointed to protect the senior lienholder’s 
interests during the interim until the foreclosure sale, due process would not be 
implicated, and perhaps this court would have reached a different result.155  
 In Huntington National Bank v. Motel 4 BAPS, Inc.,156 the Ohio Court of 
Appeals said:  
Ohio courts have held that “[Ohio Rev. Code Ann.] Chapter 2735, 
‘does not contain any restrictions on what the court may authorize 
when it issues orders regarding receivership property’, [and] . . . this 
includes the power to authorize a receiver, under certain 
circumstances, to sell property at a private sale free and clear of all 
liens and encumbrances.”157  
 The mortgagor in Huntington National Bank appealed from the lower 
court’s decision to confirm the receiver’s sale of the property after Motel 4 
                                                            
153 This case turned on whether the sale foreclosure of junior liens could wipe out senior 
interests without notice, let alone consent, of that senior interest.  Id.  However, if there were no due 
process concerns, the court may have come to a different conclusion.  In this case, the majority 
admitted freely they concurred with the dissent’s observation by saying:  
 
[The dissent] can “find no Ohio case which holds that the only way to extinguish a 
lienholder’s interest in a property is through a foreclosure action.”  Nor can [the 
majority].  However, the procedures mandated by foreclosure are more than statutory 
“hoops” through which one must jump; they embody real concepts of due process.  
Notice, opportunity to be heard, independent appraisal, and public sale are designed to 
protect the interests of all parties; due process is a notion embedded in all court action. 
 
Id.  The majority did not rule there was no ability to have a receiver sell free and clear, it only ruled 
in this specific case procedural flaws in the due process and notice requirements were so great as to 
not require the case to be decided on the basis of a receiver’s powers to sell property free and clear 
of liens.  Id. 
154 See id. (“The threshold question confronting us in this case is whether the trial court could 
authorize the receiver to take the action he took, i.e., to sell the second parcel free and clear of AFF’s 
liens even though AFF had not consented to [the] same and had not received notice that the property 
would be sold free of its lien.”). 
155 See id. (saying “a receiver's sale is subject to due-process requirements and review, and 
failure to provide the same requires reversal and remand.”  The implication is that the violation of 
due process brought about the result in this case but not that the receivership arrangement generally 
could not take similar actions if there were not any due process issues.). 
156 Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Motel 4 BAPS, Inc., 944 N.E.2d 1210 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). 
157 Id. at 1213. 
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defaulted on its loan.158  The mortgagor had filed a motion to stay the receiver’s 
auction; it claimed, “the receiver [had] failed to provide Motel 4 notice of the 
sale as required by [Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section] 2329.26[,] and that the sale 
constructively cut off Motel 4’s redemption rights.”159  The trial court conducted 
a hearing and authorized the sale by the receiver.160  In beginning its review of 
the case, the court of appeals declared, “[A] receiver is appointed for the benefit 
of all the creditors of the property subject to receivership.”161  And, the receiver, 
as an officer of the court, must act in accordance with what the court deems 
appropriate.162  The court of appeals quoted the Ohio Supreme Court, saying it 
“interpreted [Ohio Revised Code Annotated section] 2735.04 as ‘enabling the 
trial court to exercise its sound judicial discretion to limit or expand a receiver’s 
powers as it deems appropriate.’”163  The court of appeals said the standard by 
which to judge a trial court’s orders to receivers is “a reviewing court will not 
disturb the trial court’s judgment absent an abuse of discretion.”164  In this case, 
the court of appeals did not find any abuse of discretion by the trial court in 
allowing a sale free and clear of liens by the receiver.165  Thus, the receiver’s 
sale was confirmed.166 
Another Ohio Court of Appeals case is worthy of note for its contribution 
to the discussion of transfers of property made during the pendency of a 
foreclosure without being a clog on the equity of redemption.167  In Panagouleas 
Interiors, Inc. v. Silent Partner Group, Inc.,168 the court held the deed in lieu of 
foreclosure at issue was invalid,169 and, “[f]urthermore, the ‘subsequent 
agreement’ that can circumvent the prohibition against clogging typically occurs 
only after default.”170  
In 1993, Pete Panagouleas, a hotel owner specializing in hotel renovation, 
purchased a hotel located at 330 West First Street,171  “To avoid foreclosure, 
                                                            
158 Id. at 1211. 
159 Id. at 1211–12. 
160 Id. at 1212. 
161 Id. (quoting Castlebrook Ltd. v. Dayton Properties Ltd., 604 N.E.2d 808 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
162 Id.  
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 1214. 
166 Id.  
167 Note receivership sales are similar to other mortgage substitutes because they seek to alienate 
the debtor’s property without resorting to the full foreclosure process.  See NELSON ET AL., supra 
note 1, at Chapter 3. 
168 No. 18864, 2002 WL 441409 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).  
169 Id. at 12.  
170 Id. at 11. 
171 Id. at 1. 
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Panagouleas agreed to sell the hotel to Anthony Corona.”172  Corona gave a 
mortgage on the property to Panagouleas and Silent Partner Group (SPG), who 
purchased the first mortgage from Panagouleas.173  The letter outlining the terms 
of the mortgage agreement and the repayment information also provided: “The 
funding of this loan will be simultaneously consummated with a contract, full 
assignment of [n]ote and [m]ortgage and deed in lieu of foreclosure in 
escrow.”174 The letter also stated: 
[I]n the event of a default by Corona, Panagouleas will have [thirty] 
days after the interest escrow of $91,458.36 has been depleted to 
redeem the first mortgage and [d]eed in lieu of foreclosure.  If 
Panagouleas does not redeem the discharge of the [s]econd mortgage 
will be recorded.  The interest escrow will be drawn upon monthly.  
However, if Corona should default, Panagouleas will be given notice 
of the default. SPG will draw $7,621.53 monthly against the escrow 
until it is depleted.  Upon depletion of the escrow Panagouleas shall 
have [thirty] days to redeem.  If Panagouleas has not redeemed 
within the [thirty] day period SPG will record the discharge.175 
Corona defaulted on the SPG “[t]rust note and mortgage agreement almost 
immediately.”176  Panagouleas was notified on the default, and his son Pete, who 
himself was ill, “began to attempt to repurchase the note.”177  However, SPG did 
not receive any funds by the time the grace period ran out,178 and 
“[c]onsequently . . . recorded the deed in lieu of foreclosure.”179  
Corona and Panagouleas Interiors, Inc. (PI), on whose behalf Panagouleas 
signed the deed and mortgage, challenged the trial court’s finding upholding the 
validity of the deed in lieu of foreclosure.180  PI claimed the deed in lieu of 
foreclosure did not transfer legal and equitable title to SPG, and they were 
required to use traditional foreclosure procedures because the deed in lieu of 
foreclosure operated to deprive Pete Panagouleas and Anthony Corona of their 
equity of redemption.181  The court quoted Shaw v. Walbridge,182 an old, yet still 
controlling, Ohio Supreme Court case as saying: 
There is no rule of law which prevents a mortgagor from disposing 
                                                            
172 Id.  
173 Id. at 2. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 4. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 5. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 8.  
181 Id. 
182 Shaw v. Walbridge, 33 Ohio St. 1 (Ohio 1877). 
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of his equity of redemption to a mortgagee by private arrangement, 
but courts of equity will not permit a mortgagee to take advantage of 
his position so as to wrest from the mortgagor his equity, by an 
unconscionable bargain.  The transaction will be jealously 
scrutinized, but if the agreement is a fair one, under all the 
circumstances of the case, it will be upheld.183 
The court found the agreement cutting off the equity of redemption was 
made contemporaneously—all the documents were determined to be part of the 
same transaction—with the mortgage agreement, and “no agreement can be 
made at the time of the mortgage, depriving the mortgagor of his right to 
redeem.”184  The court pointed out “the ‘subsequent agreement’ that can 
circumvent the prohibition against clogging typically occurs only after 
default.”185  
Panagouleas Interiors affirmed the courts’ stance on allowing transfers of 
real property without the traditional mortgage foreclosure procedures when the 
agreement to do so is made post-default.186  It can be inferred from the court’s 
holding, when the agreement187 to transfer property not subject to traditional 
rules is made post-default, it can circumvent the prohibition against clogging the 
equity of redemption.  This particular case dealt with clogs on the equity of 
redemption that were presented in the form of deeds in lieu of foreclosure.188  
However, a similar rationale should apply when the agreement circumventing 
the prohibition against clogs on the equity of redemption is an agreement made 
post-default appointing a receiver, and granting him the ability to sell the 
property in any manner he determines is reasonably calculated to bring the 
highest purchase price, if he determines a sale is the best course of action. 
F. Washington 
Washington statutes distinguish two types of receiverships: a general 
receivership and a custodial receivership.189  One of the statutes states courts 
                                                            
183 Panagouleas Interiors, 2002 WL 441409, at 9. 
184 Id. at 10. 
185 Id. at 11 (quoting 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.44, at 37–305 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 
1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 3 (1997)).   
186 Id. 
187 There may be a requirement for new consideration, such as extension of time to pay, for the 
agreement to have legal weight.  See id.  (“Specifically, no new consideration flowed to Corona, who 
was the party relinquishing the equity of redemption.  Additionally, to the extent that the equity of 
redemption belonged to Pete, no new consideration existed either, since these matters were all part 
of the same transaction.”). 
188 Id. at 1. 
189 See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.005(10)-(11) (2004); Id. § 7.60.015 (differentiating the two 
types of receivership: “A receiver must be either a general receiver or a custodial receiver.  A 
receiver must be a general receiver if the receiver is appointed to take possession and control of all 
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should appoint a custodial receivership in cases where the sole basis for 
appointment is the pendency of an action to foreclose upon a lien against the 
property.190  Only general receivers are empowered to liquidate the receivership 
property,191 while a custodial receiver cannot.192  However, if there are more 
bases for appointing the receivership than simply the pendency of a foreclosure 
action, perhaps a general receivership can be established.193  The Revised Code 
of Washington section 7.60.025(1)(g), for example, says, “[W]hen the property . 
. . [is] in danger of waste, impairment, or destruction, or where the abandoned 
property’s owner has absconded with, secreted, or abandoned the property, and 
it is necessary to collect, conserve, manage, control, or protect it, or to dispose 
of it promptly,”194 there are grounds for a receivership to be appointed.195  
Therefore, if there is a case of a pending foreclosure of a mortgage on a 
commercial property that is quickly losing equity or depreciating in value, the 
multiple bases may warrant a general receivership being appointed to liquidate 
the property.  Even if a custodial receivership is appointed, “[t]he court by order 
may convert either a general receivership or a custodial receivership into the 
other.”196 
The Revised Code of Washington section 7.60.260(2) states court ordered 
sales under this section be made free and clear of liens—the liens attach to the 
proceeds of the sale—and all rights of redemption.197  The Washington statute 
provides safeguards to owners and lienholders similar to those found in the 
Minnesota statutes.198  There is a safeguard that shows a similar intent to 
statutory redemption laws in mortgage, which grant residential mortgagors and 
farmstead owners extra protection.199  There is also a complaint system that 
                                                            
or substantially all of a person’s property with authority to liquidate that property and, in the case of 
a business over which the receiver is appointed, wind up affairs.  A receiver must be a custodial 
receiver if the receiver is appointed to take charge of limited or specific property of a person or is not 
given authority to liquidate property.”). 
190 Id. § 7.60.015. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 In section 7.60.015, the statute clearly states, “When the sole basis for the appointment is the 
pendency of an action to foreclose upon a lien against real property . . . the court shall appoint the 
receiver as a custodial receiver.”  The legislative intent is not clear as to its treatment of cases in 
which there are multiple bases for the appointment of a receiver and which only one of those bases is 
the pendency of a foreclosure action. 
194 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.025(1)(g) (2011). 
195 Id. 
196 Id.  § 7.60.015. 
197 Id.  § 7.60.260(2) (“The court may order that a general receiver’s sale of estate property . . . 
be effected free and clear of liens and of all rights of redemption, whether or not the sale will 
generate proceeds sufficient to fully satisfy all claims secured by the property . . . . ”). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. § 7.60.260(2)(i) (stating sales free and clear of liens are allowed unless, “[t]he property is 
real property used principally in the production of crops, livestock, or aquaculture, or the property is 
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allows owners or parties with an interest in the property to file a timely 
opposition to the sale.200  The court would then have to determine if the amount 
likely to be realized by the objecting person from the receiver’s sale is less than 
the person would realize within a reasonable time in the absence of the 
receiver’s sale before proceeding with the sale.201 
IV. A POSSIBLE UNIFORM FRAMEWORK 
Real property has traditionally been treated differently than personal 
property and is afforded the extra protection of equity of redemption and, in 
some jurisdictions, statutory redemption.  Therefore, legislatures have been 
much quicker to pass laws for the execution of estates in a bankruptcy or the 
sale of personal property in satisfying a judgment lien.  However, in today’s 
global economy, one company—such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac—buying 
mortgages or deeds of trust on the secondary market may hold mortgages from 
fifty different jurisdictions and subject to fifty different sets of laws.  The system 
can, therefore, be streamlined and become more efficient from any uniform laws 
in the real property arena.  Advocating for a nationally uniform foreclosure law 
system is beyond the scope of this article.202  However, this article is suggesting 
state statutes do more to address the rights and abilities of receivers.  As it 
presently stands, many states use a simple and general catch-all, such as 
allowing receivers to “make transfers, and generally . . . do such acts respecting 
the property as the court may authorize,”203 or “generally do such acts respecting 
the property as the court authorizes.”204  These statutes leave much of the 
decisions up to the court system.  This, in turn, leads to more inefficiency, 
because it is the inefficiencies of the court system—including two-year waiting 
times for judicial foreclosure proceedings—which necessitates receiverships as 
an ancillary remedy during the pendency of those actions.  A bright line statute 
clearly laying out a framework for what is expected of a receivership, and what 
procedures and safeguards should be put in place in the case of sales of property 
by the receiver, would minimize the toll on the court system by requiring at 
most a review of the receiver’s transaction, as opposed to being intimately 
                                                            
a homestead under [WASH REV. CODE § 6.13.010(1)], and the owner of the property has not 
consented to the sale following the appointment of the receiver . . . .”). 
200 Id. § 7.60.260(2)(ii) (“The owner of the property or a creditor with an interest in the property 
serves and files a timely opposition to the receiver’s sale, and the court determines that the amount 
likely to be realized by the objecting person from the receiver’s sale is less than the person would 
realize within a reasonable time in the absence of the receiver’s sale.”). 
201 Id. 
202 See generally supra note 42 (discussing, even where sweeping uniform foreclosure laws have 
been introduced, they have not been adopted). 
203 See supra note 46.  
204 See supra note 47. 
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involved at every step. 
A uniform statute allowing receiver sales, especially sales free and clear of 
liens, during a foreclosure proceeding would have to balance two sides.  On one 
hand, it would grant the receiver a measure of independent authority, which 
would allow him to determine what type of sale to use or if a sale is the best 
course of action at all.  It would also incentivize the receiver to engage real 
estate brokers to facilitate a possible sale.  The other side of the scale would be 
measures to ensure the sale does not clog the equity of redemption or obstruct 
statutory rights of redemption.  A state’s receivership sales statute could address 
these concerns by requiring the choice or agreement to sell to be made after the 
default by the mortgagor, either in court or in a private agreement by the parties.  
It could also require court approval of a potential sale to ensure no foul play by 
the receivers.  These safeguards would ensure the ability to sell without resort to 
a full foreclosure proceeding is not granted at the same time as the mortgage is 
issued, which raises issues of possible clogs on the equity of redemption.  The 
rights of junior lienholders whose interests are subject to being extinguished by 
way of the receiver’s free and clear sale should be granted the right to object to 
the sale in a manner similar to the system discussed in the statutory frameworks 
of both Minnesota and Washington.205  
In addressing statutory rights of redemption where they apply, a sale could 
be made subject to it, though that would reduce potential purchase prices.  Or, 
since those rights are statutory, a receiver sales statute could be made to be an 
exception from the redemption right by the same body that instituted the right.  
Alternatively, the receivership sales statutes could have built in exceptions for 
the classes of people that statutory redemption is primarily aimed at helping 
retain possession of their property—homestead and farmstead owners.  The 
blueprint for such an exception can be found in the statutory framework of 
Minnesota and Washington.  In Washington’s revised code section 7.60.260(2), 
for example, it lays out the exceptions: 
The court may order that a general receiver’s sale of estate property 
either (a) under subsection (1) of this section, or (b) consisting of 
real property which the debtor intended to sell in its ordinary course 
of business be effected free and clear of liens and of all rights of 
redemption, whether or not the sale will generate proceeds sufficient 
to fully satisfy all claims secured by the property, unless either: 
(i) The property is real property used principally in the production of 
crops, livestock, or aquaculture, or the property is a homestead 
                                                            
205 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.  “If a timely objection is filed, the court will 
determine whether the amount likely to be realized from the sale by the objecting person is less than 
the objecting person would realize within a reasonable time in the absence of this sale”.  MINN. 
STAT. § 576.461(a) (2014). 
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under RCW 6.13.010(1), and the owner of the property has not 
consented to the sale following the appointment of the receiver . . . 
.206  
Minnesota statutes section 576.46, subd. 1(a)(1) uses similar language:  
The court may order that a general receiver’s sale of receivership 
property is free and clear of all liens, except any lien for unpaid real 
estate taxes or assessments and liens arising under federal law, and 
may be free of the rights of redemption of the respondent if the 
rights of redemption are receivership property and the rights of 
redemption of the holders of any liens, regardless of whether the sale 
will generate proceeds sufficient to fully satisfy all liens on the 
property, unless either: (1) the property is (i) real property classified 
as agricultural land under section 273.13, subdivision 23, or the 
property is a homestead under section 510.01; and (ii) each of the 
owners of the property has not consented to the sale following the 
time of appointment . . . .207 
For a receivership statute to increase efficiency and uniformity in the law, 
and allow sales of real property free and clear of liens without infringing on any 
traditional rights associated with real property, it would require three elements: 
First, agreements allowing the receiver to sell the property must be agreed to by 
the mortgagor post-default to avoid clogging the equity of redemption; second, 
there must be an objection system that allows junior lienholders an opportunity 
to prove they would receive more value if not for the proposed sale (any party 
that feels the proposed sale price is too low can also employ this objection 
system); and third, the statute should include the built in protections for 
homestead and farmstead owners.208   
V. CONCLUSION  
This article discusses receiverships that arise during the pendency of a 
foreclosure sale, be it through a judicial sale or a power of sale deed of trust in 
the states in which they are available.  The primary issue is the capture of as 
much money as possible for the benefit of the mortgagee in a commercial 
mortgage setting, where rents are accruing even after the mortgagor’s default.  
                                                            
206  WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.260(2) (2011). 
207  MINN. STAT. § 576.46, subd. 1(a)(1) (2012). 
208 See infra Part I.  The mortgages generally needing the protection afforded by a receiver’s 
right to sell are non-recourse commercial mortgages wherein the mortgagee can lose equity rapidly 
during the pendency of the sale.  Id.  Homestead and farmstead owners on the other hand, are the 
mortgagors the protections of mortgage law were primarily developed to protect.  Id.  Furthermore, 
homestead and farmstead owners are often at a bargaining disadvantage to large institutional 
lenders—mortgagees.  Thus, putting statutory protections in place to protect their interest stops 
mortgagees from taking advantage of their weaker bargaining position. 
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This article examines the statutory framework of a selection of states to 
determine the extent of the receiver’s powers, with a specific eye towards his or 
her power to sell the property and the limits regarding that power, if it exists at 
all.  Real property is an area of law that is very diverse and differs from state to 
state.  This article argues, however, in the modern world of commercial 
mortgages, where the mortgagee is often an institutional lender with a multi-
state presence and even the mortgagors or at least their investors can span states, 
there should be a trend towards uniformity in the law.  
